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The introduction of polythetic diagnostic criteria and their operational definitions from DSM-
III onwards has been a mixed blessing for clinical and scientific psychiatry. While enhancing 
reliability and standardization in research and practice, it also led to a number of unintended 
and undesirable consequences. 
 
Chief amongst these is the well-known problem of diagnostic heterogeneity. In their recent 
contribution to this journal1, Fried et al note 10 377 unique symptom profiles for major 
depression, a number which only increases when the specifier melancholia is considered (i.e., 
341 737 unique profiles). Obviously, this is not so much an empirical discovery, as a logical 
consequence of the operational decision to define disorders in terms of additive independent 
criteria: the more criteria, the more possible combinations, the more potential diagnostic 
heterogeneity.  
 
It remains unclear, however, which precise lessons we should take home from this 
mathematical reductio ad absurdum.   
 
A first possible lesson might emphasize the urgent need to critically reconsider the larger 
operational approach to psychiatric diagnosis itself. Apart from the artificial inflation of 
diagnostic heterogeneity stressed by the authors, operationalism also resulted in an overly 
simplified approach to psychopathological description of syndromes and symptoms.2 In the 
case of (melancholic) depression, e.g., this spurred a questionable expansion of the concept 
to include an all-embracing class of various states of general unhappiness with indistinct 
boundaries to states of normal psychology.3  On this account, what is needed is not so much 
a discarding or downgrading of traditional diagnostic categories like, e.g., melancholia or 
schizophrenia, but rather a resuscitation of fine-grained psychopathological understanding 
and assessment beyond the checklist-approach of counting criteria and symptoms.4  
 
However, this does not seem to be the lesson presented by the authors. In fact, rather than 
exposing the absurdity of the operational-criteriological approach to psychiatric diagnosis 
through their mathematical exercise, they assume the validity of the latter approach to 
challenge the idea that melancholia (and potentially other specifiers) identifies a more 
homogenous group of patients. In a way, DSM’s operationalism is not questioned or 
abandoned here but merely turned against itself.  
 
This is also apparent in the symptom-oriented solution to the problem of diagnostic 
heterogeneity championed by the first author (e.g.5). Focusing on symptoms rather than 
broader categories is a currently popular proposal and is, e.g., one of the basic tenets behind 
novel network-approaches to psychopathology. Yet, it is perhaps insufficiently emphasized 
how the very idea of focusing on symptoms regardless of how they are meaningfully 
embedded in broader psychopathological Gestalts is a continuation of DSM’s operationalism, 
rather than a radical break with it.2,6 Indeed, a novel feature of that approach was the 
definition of clinical syndromes (e.g., schizophrenia) in terms of combinations of individual 
symptoms (e.g., hallucinations and delusions) which could be described independently from 
the former. Yet, such context-independent definition of individual symptoms requires that 
they are formulated in a more general or abstract way.6 Importantly, this means that 
whatever heterogeneity one hoped to avoid by turning to individual symptoms can now be 
expected to return at this supposedly more basic level of description (see7 for empirical 
evidence in the case of hallucinations).     
 
In sum, the operational approach to psychiatric diagnosis has had a number of unwelcome 
consequences of which heterogeneity is but the most obvious outcome. In our view, this is 
not solved by choosing between syndromes or symptoms, but by critically revisiting that larger 
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